China’s Economic Recovery Slowed In April
Growth in retail sales slowed sharply from March pace.
3 min
BEIJING—China’s economic activity grew at a slower pace in April as retail sales missed expectations, complicating the picture of a steady and balanced recovery in the world’s second-largest economy.
Official data released Monday showed industrial output and fixed-asset investment beating market expectations and continuing to lead the recovery, but domestic consumer spending, which has lagged behind for months, remaining soft.
China’s industrial production in April was up 9.8% from a year earlier, slower than March’s 14.1% pace, the National Bureau of Statistics said Monday. Fixed-asset investment decelerated as well, to 19.9% in the January-April period from 25.6% in the first quarter.
Retail sales, a key gauge of China’s domestic consumption, underwhelmed: April’s figure was up 17.7% from the pandemic-hit level a year earlier, well short of March’s 34.2% pace.
Economists had largely expected the double-digit year-over-year percentage growth that major indicators delivered, given the low-base of comparison from a year earlier, when China’s economy had just begun to bounce back from the coronavirus shock. In the coming months, however, that “low-base effect” will fade, given the economy’s recovery during the spring and summer last year.
Monday’s figures on industrial output and fixed-asset investment actually exceeded the forecasts of economists polled by The Wall Street Journal, who had pegged 9.1% and 19.2%, respectively. Retail sales, however, missed their predicted 24.9%.
To strip out last year’s pandemic distortions, government statisticians and economists have benchmarked this year’s numbers against 2019’s. By that measure, official data showed industrial production up 14.1% in April, largely in line with March’s growth rate, while the pace of retail-sales slowed to 8.8% from March’s 12.9%.
The retail-sales miss was a particular disappointment for economists and policy makers, who have been watching for several months for signs of a tilt toward consumption-driven growth in the Chinese economy, after more than a year of expansion led by manufacturing and exports.
For the Chinese economy as a whole, says Ding Shuang, an economist at Standard Chartered, “The problem is not the growth rate, but its unbalanced recovery. Some sectors, such as industrial activity, appeared to be too hot, while others, like service and consumption, haven’t yet recovered to pre-virus levels.”
China’s strong rebound from the Covid-19 pandemic last year was largely driven by its swift factory resumption and government-led investment, while household spending has repeatedly fallen short of expectations.
Pointing to the softness in domestic spending, the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo—its top decision-making body—said last month that the economic recovery remains uneven and its foundation less than solid.
China’s gross domestic product reported a record year-over-year gain of 18.3% in the first quarter. That makes meeting Beijing’s official target of “above 6%” growth for 2021 a relatively light lift.
Economists argue that the modest growth target leaves Beijing’s policy makers with more wiggle room to address longer-term structural problems in the economy—such as high leverage, potential asset-price bubbles and, in particular, the weakness of domestic consumption.
Chinese policy makers face a dilemma, Louis Kuijs, an economist with Oxford Economics, told clients in a note Monday: While Beijing wants to dial down leverage generally, the persistently weak consumption numbers may increase “pressure to pursue a more pro-growth macro policy that could increase financial risks and leverage.”
April’s lacklustre consumption data came even as China’s labour market showed signs of improvement. The urban surveyed unemployment rate, China’s headline jobless figure, dropped to 5.1% in April, the lowest level in more than a year.
In a briefing Monday, Fu Linghui, a spokesman for China’s statistics bureau, acknowledged the imbalance in the economic recovery, but said the improving labour market and increasing household income would lift consumption.
Iris Pang, an economist with ING Group, said April’s consumption weakness might prove short-lived, with figures for the five-day Labor Day holiday at the start of May indicating robust spending.
Over the holiday, Chinese people made a total of 230 million trips, marking the first time that traveller numbers topped pre-virus levels. The nation’s box office also broke records for revenue and number of moviegoers.
Meanwhile, though fewer cities in China reported rising home prices in April, average new home prices nationwide in April were up 4.45% from a year earlier, official statisticians said Monday, following a 4.36% year-over-year rise in March—underscoring the challenge that policy makers face in reining in home prices.
Reprinted by permission of The Wall Street Journal, Copyright 2021 Dow Jones & Company. Inc. All Rights Reserved Worldwide. Original date of publication: May 18, 2021.
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Competitive pressure and creativity have made Chinese-designed and -built electric cars formidable competitors
4 min
China rocked the auto world twice this year. First, its electric vehicles stunned Western rivals at the Shanghai auto show with their quality, features and price. Then came reports that in the first quarter of 2023 it dethroned Japan as the world’s largest auto exporter.
How is China in contention to lead the world’s most lucrative and prestigious consumer goods market, one long dominated by American, European, Japanese and South Korean nameplates? The answer is a unique combination of industrial policy, protectionism and homegrown competitive dynamism. Western policy makers and business leaders are better prepared for the first two than the third.
Start with industrial policy—the use of government resources to help favoured sectors. China has practiced industrial policy for decades. While it’s finding increased favour even in the U.S., the concept remains controversial. Governments have a poor record of identifying winning technologies and often end up subsidising inferior and wasteful capacity, including in China.
But in the case of EVs, Chinese industrial policy had a couple of things going for it. First, governments around the world saw climate change as an enduring threat that would require decade-long interventions to transition away from fossil fuels. China bet correctly that in transportation, the transition would favour electric vehicles.
In 2009, China started handing out generous subsidies to buyers of EVs. Public procurement of taxis and buses was targeted to electric vehicles, rechargers were subsidised, and provincial governments stumped up capital for lithium mining and refining for EV batteries. In 2020 NIO, at the time an aspiring challenger to Tesla, avoided bankruptcy thanks to a government-led bailout.
While industrial policy guaranteed a demand for EVs, protectionism ensured those EVs would be made in China, by Chinese companies. To qualify for subsidies, cars had to be domestically made, although foreign brands did qualify. They also had to have batteries made by Chinese companies, giving Chinese national champions like Contemporary Amperex Technology and BYD an advantage over then-market leaders from Japan and South Korea.
To sell in China, foreign automakers had to abide by conditions intended to upgrade the local industry’s skills. State-owned Guangzhou Automobile Group developed the manufacturing know-how necessary to become a player in EVs thanks to joint ventures with Toyota and Honda, said Gregor Sebastian, an analyst at Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies.
Despite all that government support, sales of EVs remained weak until 2019, when China let Tesla open a wholly owned factory in Shanghai. “It took this catalyst…to boost interest and increase the level of competitiveness of the local Chinese makers,” said Tu Le, managing director of Sino Auto Insights, a research service specialising in the Chinese auto industry.
Back in 2011 Pony Ma, the founder of Tencent, explained what set Chinese capitalism apart from its American counterpart. “In America, when you bring an idea to market you usually have several months before competition pops up, allowing you to capture significant market share,” he said, according to Fast Company, a technology magazine. “In China, you can have hundreds of competitors within the first hours of going live. Ideas are not important in China—execution is.”
Thanks to that competition and focus on execution, the EV industry went from a niche industrial-policy project to a sprawling ecosystem of predominantly private companies. Much of this happened below the Western radar while China was cut off from the world because of Covid-19 restrictions.
When Western auto executives flew in for April’s Shanghai auto show, “they saw a sea of green plates, a sea of Chinese brands,” said Le, referring to the green license plates assigned to clean-energy vehicles in China. “They hear the sounds of the door closing, sit inside and look at the quality of the materials, the fabric or the plastic on the console, that’s the other holy s— moment—they’ve caught up to us.”
Manufacturers of gasoline cars are product-oriented, whereas EV manufacturers, like tech companies, are user-oriented, Le said. Chinese EVs feature at least two, often three, display screens, one suitable for watching movies from the back seat, multiple lidars (laser-based sensors) for driver assistance, and even a microphone for karaoke (quickly copied by Tesla). Meanwhile, Chinese suppliers such as CATL have gone from laggard to leader.
Chinese dominance of EVs isn’t preordained. The low barriers to entry exploited by Chinese brands also open the door to future non-Chinese competitors. Nor does China’s success in EVs necessarily translate to other sectors where industrial policy matters less and creativity, privacy and deeply woven technological capability—such as software, cloud computing and semiconductors—matter more.
Still, the threat to Western auto market share posed by Chinese EVs is one for which Western policy makers have no obvious answer. “You can shut off your own market and to a certain extent that will shield production for your domestic needs,” said Sebastian. “The question really is, what are you going to do for the global south, countries that are still very happily trading with China?”
Western companies themselves are likely to respond by deepening their presence in China—not to sell cars, but for proximity to the most sophisticated customers and suppliers. Jörg Wuttke, the past president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, calls China a “fitness centre.” Even as conditions there become steadily more difficult, Western multinationals “have to be there. It keeps you fit.”
Chris Dixon, a partner who led the charge, says he has a ‘very long-term horizon’
Americans now think they need at least $1.25 million for retirement, a 20% increase from a year ago, according to a survey by Northwestern Mutual
