On Wall Street, Lawyers Make More Than Bankers Now

Over the past few years, as the Manhattan real-estate broker Lisa Lippman took her well-heeled clients through $7 million-plus apartments with Central Park views and amenities including squash courts and lap pools, she noticed a change: It was no longer bankers making a lot of the offers. It was lawyers.

“It used to be you’d say someone is an investment banker, and that was a big deal. Now it’s like meh,” Lippman, a former lawyer, said. “If I had to pick my favourite buyers, it would be big-time lawyers.”

While bankers used to make multiples of what lawyers did, the lawyers have been zooming ahead, thanks to stagnant banker pay for all but the very top performers and changing dynamics at law firms. The trend took hold well before the recent slowdown in deal making dented banker pay.

The Wall Street Journal spoke to more than 30 compensation experts, bankers and lawyers and reviewed pay data over more than 15 years.

Managing directors who aren’t in high-ranking leadership roles at banks make an average of between $1 million and $2 million most years, including bonuses often paid largely in stock, more or less unchanged from where it was two decades ago.

Equity partners at top law firms, meanwhile, can make around $3 million or more a year—more than triple what they were pulling in two decades ago. An elite group of partners who bring in exceptional amounts of business are earning north of $15 million at a handful of firms including Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Kirkland & Ellis; and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison.

“Things have changed,” said Mark Rosen, a longtime legal recruiter. “Lawyer compensation has grown unbelievably.”

In 2000, when Rob Kindler, an established deals lawyer, left the white-shoe law firm Cravath, Swaine & Moore to get into banking, a Journal story said he could make around five times as much money at an investment bank.

Earlier this month Kindler, 69, left Morgan Stanley to join the law firm Paul Weiss. There, he stands to make upward of $10 million a year, depending on performance, likely more than he was earning at Morgan Stanley.

Lawyers and bankers are the linchpins of Wall Street, working in tandem to facilitate all manner of maneuvers for the world’s biggest companies. Specialists in both professions help clients raise money, do deals and ward off unwanted suitors or investors.

Kirkland & Ellis has hired partners from other law firms to bolster its business. PHOTO: MICHAEL BUCHER/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The reasons for the shifting fortunes between the two groups are varied. No longer relegated to simply marking up contracts, today’s corporate lawyers are quasibankers, serving as sounding boards for corporate executives as they clash with regulators or wrestle with thorny issues such as succession planning. They have also received an outsize amount of work from the rise of private equity, a client base that was nowhere near as active 20 years ago.

At the same time, the law-firm industry’s compensation structure has been upended, as all but a few of the largest firms abandon the so-called lockstep pay structure in which partner payouts are solely based on seniority, rather than productivity. That has created a new era of bidding wars for talent, akin to sports teams stretching their wallets to sign star players.

Kirkland, in particular, put competition in overdrive over the past 15 years as it poached partners from other firms to jump-start its business. Kirkland has offered potential recruits deals that could be worth $20 million or more annually for the first few years, significantly more than most could make elsewhere.

Most big law firms raise their prices by around 4% each year, usually more than topping inflation, according to Owen Burman, a Wells Fargo senior consultant who tracks the industry. Banker deal fees, while large, are relatively static. Top lawyers currently charge more than $2,000 an hour for their time.

Some high performers at top firms earn more than $15 million, and an elite few get well over $20 million. Paul Weiss’s Scott Barshay and Kirkland’s James Sprayregen are often singled out as among the highest-paid lawyers on Wall Street. (JPMorgan Chase Chief Executive Jamie Dimon, by comparison, made $34.5 million last year, with most of it paid in company stock.)

While standout law firm partners might bring in around $20 million in annual revenue, superstars can bring in $100 million or more, said Rosen, the legal recruiter.

The riches can come at a price. Advising companies at their most critical moments means the work is 24/7. Rosen said it isn’t uncommon for his clients to work 18-hour days, on weekends. One lawyer recalled being on a client call while posing for family photos at his son’s bar mitzvah.

Bankers’ work can be similarly nonstop, but compensation for most hasn’t continued the trajectory it was on before the 2008 financial crisis, according to survey data from the recruiting firm Bay Street Advisors.

Bay Street’s analysis shows that the average managing director at a top-20 investment bank not leading a group made $1.9 million a year over the past three years (which included a standout 2021), compared with $1.9 million in 2007. And that is without accounting for inflation. Lower-level bankers are making even less on average than they were precrisis.

Pressure from regulators, increasing expenses and a move toward selling big banks’ brand names rather than individuals have all hurt pay. While it was typical before the financial crisis for so-called bulge-bracket banks such as Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan Stanley to spend well over 40% of revenue on pay, that figure is now much lower.

“Every time the banks get wind in their sails, we hit a hiccup and get set back a few years again,” said Kevin Mahoney, a senior partner at Bay Street who runs its investment-banking practice.

It used to be common for bankers to retire in their 50s, having amassed sizable fortunes. That is less often seen now.

But don’t start shedding tears for them just yet. Their pay still dwarfs the median U.S. household income of around $70,000 a year. And star bankers—especially at independent advisory firms such as Centerview Partners—can still haul in a healthy eight-figure payday or more in a good year.

Dana Cimilluca and Alexander Saeedy contributed to this article.

A sharp technology sell-off has exposed a new anxiety on global markets: whether the enormous borrowing behind the artificial-intelligence infrastructure boom can generate sufficient returns as interest rates rise and Chinese competition intensifies.

The artificial-intelligence investment boom has powered technology shares, semiconductor manufacturers and data-centre operators to extraordinary heights. Last week, investors were given a reminder that much of this expansion is being built with borrowed money.

The technology-heavy Nasdaq Composite fell 4.5 per cent over the week ended October 16, its weakest performance since late June. Semiconductor shares suffered an even deeper correction, with the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index losing about 11.4 per cent.

The selling spread quickly through global markets. Micron Technology fell 14.6 per cent over the week, while South Korea’s Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix dropped approximately 18 per cent and 24 per cent respectively.

This was more than a routine bout of profit-taking. Investors were reassessing three interconnected risks: higher interest rates, the rapidly expanding debt burden attached to AI infrastructure and the prospect of stronger competition from Chinese memory-chip manufacturers.

The debt behind the AI build-out

Artificial intelligence requires a physical infrastructure network of enormous scale. Data centres must be built, advanced processors purchased, power supplies secured and cooling systems installed before customers begin generating meaningful revenue from them.

Technology companies are increasingly supplementing their own cash with corporate bonds, syndicated loans, equipment leases, private credit and project-level financing.

JPMorgan describes the emerging funding model as a combination of conventional corporate borrowing and project finance tied to individual data-centre assets. In Australia, the Reserve Bank estimates that syndicated loans accounted for approximately three-quarters of data-centre financing during 2025 and 2026 to date.

The numbers are becoming large enough to affect broader credit markets. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has cited Wall Street estimates suggesting AI-related investment-grade bond issuance could approach US$300 billion in 2026 alone.

That borrowing is not automatically problematic. Debt can be an efficient way to finance long-lived infrastructure when future revenue is sufficiently predictable. The concern is that AI technology, customer demand and computing economics are changing much faster than the repayment schedules attached to the assets.

A data centre financed today may carry debt for years. Investors must therefore make assumptions about future utilisation rates, electricity prices, chip performance, customer concentration and the amount businesses will ultimately pay for AI computing.

When interest rates rise, those assumptions become less forgiving.

Inflation changes the calculation

September’s US inflation data intensified the pressure. Consumer prices increased 3.7 per cent over the year, ahead of market expectations and up from 3.4 per cent in August.

The hotter reading reduced confidence that interest rates would fall quickly and pushed bond yields higher. That matters particularly for companies whose valuations depend on profits expected well into the future, as well as highly leveraged infrastructure operators that may need to refinance.

CoreWeave has emerged as a closely watched test case. The specialist cloud-computing company has accumulated substantial debt and lease obligations to build AI capacity, while relying on a concentrated group of large technology customers.

Its shares fell sharply during the sell-off, while the cost of insuring its debt against default climbed. CoreWeave has argued that its contracted backlog more than covers its obligations and that financial markets do not always understand its business model. Nevertheless, its securities have become a proxy for investor confidence in debt-funded AI infrastructure.

Oracle, another major investor in AI computing capacity, fell 8.8 per cent in Friday trading, while CoreWeave dropped 15.5 per cent.

The question is shifting from how much AI infrastructure can be built to how profitably it can be operated.

China adds another source of pressure

Interest rates were not the only catalyst. Reports of advances by Chinese memory-chip producer ChangXin Memory Technologies raised concerns that lower-cost Chinese products could increase competition across the global semiconductor industry.

Memory chips are essential to AI systems, but the industry is historically cyclical. Periods of tight supply and high pricing can encourage rapid investment, eventually producing oversupply and falling margins.

The prospect of a well-funded Chinese competitor expanding its technological capabilities unsettled investors in Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron. It also demonstrated that AI-related demand does not insulate chipmakers from conventional competitive pressures.

That combination—slower rate cuts, more expensive financing and potentially cheaper supply—challenged the assumption that every company exposed to AI would enjoy continually expanding margins.

A reset rather than the end of the boom

The sell-off does not establish that the AI boom is ending. Demand for computing power remains strong, the largest technology companies continue to generate formidable cash flows and many infrastructure projects are backed by long-term customer contracts.

What has changed is the market’s willingness to overlook the price and financing structure of that growth.

The most resilient companies are likely to be those able to fund investment from operating cash flow, secure long-duration customers and demonstrate that new capacity will earn returns comfortably above its financing costs.

More speculative operators may face greater scrutiny, particularly where debt is expensive, customers are concentrated or expected revenue depends on demand that has not yet materialised.

For Australian investors, the lesson extends beyond US technology shares. Local data-centre operators, infrastructure funds, electricity suppliers and property groups are increasingly exposed to the same investment cycle.

Artificial intelligence may remain one of the defining growth themes of the decade. But last week’s correction showed that enthusiasm for the technology does not eliminate financial discipline.

The next stage of the AI boom will be judged not only by computing power, model performance or demand for chips, but by something more traditional: whether the assets being financed can generate enough cash to repay the money borrowed to build them.

Fact box

Nasdaq Composite: Down 4.5 per cent for the week ended October 16, 2026

Philadelphia Semiconductor Index: Down approximately 11.4 per cent

Micron Technology: Down approximately 14.6 per cent

Samsung Electronics: Down approximately 18 per cent

SK Hynix: Down approximately 24 per cent

US September inflation: 3.7 per cent annually

Estimated 2026 AI-related investment-grade issuance: Approximately US$300 billion