The Biggest Winners in America’s Climate Law: Foreign Companies

The 2022 climate law unleashed a torrent of government subsidies to help the U.S. build clean-energy industries. The biggest beneficiaries so far are foreign companies.

The Inflation Reduction Act has spurred nearly $110 billion in U.S. clean-energy projects since it passed almost a year ago, a Wall Street Journal analysis shows. Companies based overseas, largely from South Korea, Japan and China, are involved in projects accounting for more than 60% of that spending. Fifteen of the 20 largest such investments, nearly all in battery factories, involve foreign businesses, the Journal’s analysis shows.

These overseas manufacturers will be able to claim billions of dollars in tax credits, making them among the biggest winners from the climate law. The credits are often tied to production volume, rewarding the largest investors.

Japan’s Panasonic, one of the few companies to publicly estimate the impact of the law, could earn more than $2 billion in tax credits a year based on the capacity of battery plants it is operating or building in Nevada and Kansas. The company, which supplies batteries to electric-vehicle maker Tesla, is considering a third factory in the U.S. that would lift that total.

The climate law is designed to build up domestic supply chains for green-energy industries, but the reality is that the technology for building batteries and renewable-energy equipment resides overseas. The incentives are leading these companies to invest in the U.S., often alongside domestic businesses.

“It’s a testament to the fact that we still live in a globalised economy,” said Aniket Shah, head of environmental, social and corporate governance—or ESG—strategy at investment bank Jefferies. “You can’t just out of nowhere put up borders and say, ‘It has to be made in America by American companies.’ ”

The Journal looked at roughly 210 clean-energy projects and company initiatives spurred by the law, including projects tracked by industry groups American Clean Power and E2 (Environmental Entrepreneurs); announcements from companies and state and local governments; and media reports. Of those, about 140 disclosed investment amounts totalling roughly $110 billion.

Projects were characterised as either wholly U.S. ventures or foreign if overseas companies are contributing significant investment or technology. Renewable-power facilities and projects already in the works before the law passed were excluded.

Forecasters estimate the climate law could unleash some $3 trillion in total clean-energy investments over the next decade. U.S. companies are also investing heavily, including Tesla, solar-panel maker First Solar and hydrogen producer Air Products and Chemicals.

Full domestic supply chains for batteries or solar panels are still years away because foreign companies dominate nearly every step in the process, from raw materials to sophisticated parts.

Panasonic is considering the addition of a third battery factory in the U.S. that would increase the Japanese company’s tax-credit haul. PHOTO: JACOB KEPLER FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The large investments by overseas businesses have generally been welcomed by U.S. communities, many of which have benefited for decades from spending and jobs created by foreign automakers and other companies. But some investments from Chinese companies have fuelled a backlash as tensions between the two countries escalate.

At least 10 of the projects representing nearly $8 billion in investments included in the Journal’s analysis involve companies either based in China or with substantial ties to China through their core operations or large investors.

Some projects are facing resistance, including two in Michigan: a $3.5 billion battery factory that Ford Motor is building with technology and expertise from China’s CATL; and a $2.4 billion battery-component factory from China-based Gotion. Ford is keeping 100% ownership of the battery factory—in part to sidestep the issue of public funds flowing to CATL, according to a person with knowledge of the deal. Ford is licensing the battery-making know-how and services from CATL, the companies said.

But China hawks say the payments Ford makes to CATL mean the Chinese company reaps indirect benefits from government support.

“What we’re seeing is foreign policy conflict with climate policy and trade policy,” Shah said. “We’re going to have to decide as a country what matters more: our enmity with China or our desire to decarbonise quickly.”

Microvast, a startup that was planning to build a more than $500 million battery-component plant in Kentucky, was named as a potential recipient of a $200 million grant from the Energy Department last year. The department later rejected the application. The move followed criticism from Republicans about the company’s ties to China, which include a China subsidiary that accounts for more than 60% of its revenue.

The Energy Department didn’t give a reason for withdrawing the grant. The department takes a number of factors into account when evaluating such projects, including technology risks and the potential for foreign influence, a spokeswoman said.

Microvast, based in Stafford, Texas, says it is a U.S. company and that Chief Executive Yang Wu is an American citizen. The company recently scrapped plans for the Kentucky plant.

“We must be assured that these taxpayer dollars are not being funnelled to the Chinese,” said Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R., Wash.), chair of the House of Representatives committee on energy and commerce, during a June hearing.

Microvast is committed to its goals of investing in the U.S. through other facilities, a spokeswoman said.

The issue is expected to come to a head when the Treasury Department completes rules for electric-car tax credits. The department has proposed that cars using battery materials that were produced by a “foreign entity of concern” such as a Chinese company wouldn’t qualify for tax credits beginning in 2025.

Many expect Treasury to use a loose standard so that some cars qualify, potentially fuelling criticism from some politicians who crafted the climate law such as Sen. Joe Manchin (D., W.Va.), who has argued more lenient criteria go against the intent of the Inflation Reduction Act. Treasury is monitoring shifting markets and supply chains while making rules that advance the law’s goals, a spokeswoman said.

A sharp technology sell-off has exposed a new anxiety on global markets: whether the enormous borrowing behind the artificial-intelligence infrastructure boom can generate sufficient returns as interest rates rise and Chinese competition intensifies.

The artificial-intelligence investment boom has powered technology shares, semiconductor manufacturers and data-centre operators to extraordinary heights. Last week, investors were given a reminder that much of this expansion is being built with borrowed money.

The technology-heavy Nasdaq Composite fell 4.5 per cent over the week ended October 16, its weakest performance since late June. Semiconductor shares suffered an even deeper correction, with the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index losing about 11.4 per cent.

The selling spread quickly through global markets. Micron Technology fell 14.6 per cent over the week, while South Korea’s Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix dropped approximately 18 per cent and 24 per cent respectively.

This was more than a routine bout of profit-taking. Investors were reassessing three interconnected risks: higher interest rates, the rapidly expanding debt burden attached to AI infrastructure and the prospect of stronger competition from Chinese memory-chip manufacturers.

The debt behind the AI build-out

Artificial intelligence requires a physical infrastructure network of enormous scale. Data centres must be built, advanced processors purchased, power supplies secured and cooling systems installed before customers begin generating meaningful revenue from them.

Technology companies are increasingly supplementing their own cash with corporate bonds, syndicated loans, equipment leases, private credit and project-level financing.

JPMorgan describes the emerging funding model as a combination of conventional corporate borrowing and project finance tied to individual data-centre assets. In Australia, the Reserve Bank estimates that syndicated loans accounted for approximately three-quarters of data-centre financing during 2025 and 2026 to date.

The numbers are becoming large enough to affect broader credit markets. The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has cited Wall Street estimates suggesting AI-related investment-grade bond issuance could approach US$300 billion in 2026 alone.

That borrowing is not automatically problematic. Debt can be an efficient way to finance long-lived infrastructure when future revenue is sufficiently predictable. The concern is that AI technology, customer demand and computing economics are changing much faster than the repayment schedules attached to the assets.

A data centre financed today may carry debt for years. Investors must therefore make assumptions about future utilisation rates, electricity prices, chip performance, customer concentration and the amount businesses will ultimately pay for AI computing.

When interest rates rise, those assumptions become less forgiving.

Inflation changes the calculation

September’s US inflation data intensified the pressure. Consumer prices increased 3.7 per cent over the year, ahead of market expectations and up from 3.4 per cent in August.

The hotter reading reduced confidence that interest rates would fall quickly and pushed bond yields higher. That matters particularly for companies whose valuations depend on profits expected well into the future, as well as highly leveraged infrastructure operators that may need to refinance.

CoreWeave has emerged as a closely watched test case. The specialist cloud-computing company has accumulated substantial debt and lease obligations to build AI capacity, while relying on a concentrated group of large technology customers.

Its shares fell sharply during the sell-off, while the cost of insuring its debt against default climbed. CoreWeave has argued that its contracted backlog more than covers its obligations and that financial markets do not always understand its business model. Nevertheless, its securities have become a proxy for investor confidence in debt-funded AI infrastructure.

Oracle, another major investor in AI computing capacity, fell 8.8 per cent in Friday trading, while CoreWeave dropped 15.5 per cent.

The question is shifting from how much AI infrastructure can be built to how profitably it can be operated.

China adds another source of pressure

Interest rates were not the only catalyst. Reports of advances by Chinese memory-chip producer ChangXin Memory Technologies raised concerns that lower-cost Chinese products could increase competition across the global semiconductor industry.

Memory chips are essential to AI systems, but the industry is historically cyclical. Periods of tight supply and high pricing can encourage rapid investment, eventually producing oversupply and falling margins.

The prospect of a well-funded Chinese competitor expanding its technological capabilities unsettled investors in Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron. It also demonstrated that AI-related demand does not insulate chipmakers from conventional competitive pressures.

That combination—slower rate cuts, more expensive financing and potentially cheaper supply—challenged the assumption that every company exposed to AI would enjoy continually expanding margins.

A reset rather than the end of the boom

The sell-off does not establish that the AI boom is ending. Demand for computing power remains strong, the largest technology companies continue to generate formidable cash flows and many infrastructure projects are backed by long-term customer contracts.

What has changed is the market’s willingness to overlook the price and financing structure of that growth.

The most resilient companies are likely to be those able to fund investment from operating cash flow, secure long-duration customers and demonstrate that new capacity will earn returns comfortably above its financing costs.

More speculative operators may face greater scrutiny, particularly where debt is expensive, customers are concentrated or expected revenue depends on demand that has not yet materialised.

For Australian investors, the lesson extends beyond US technology shares. Local data-centre operators, infrastructure funds, electricity suppliers and property groups are increasingly exposed to the same investment cycle.

Artificial intelligence may remain one of the defining growth themes of the decade. But last week’s correction showed that enthusiasm for the technology does not eliminate financial discipline.

The next stage of the AI boom will be judged not only by computing power, model performance or demand for chips, but by something more traditional: whether the assets being financed can generate enough cash to repay the money borrowed to build them.

Fact box

Nasdaq Composite: Down 4.5 per cent for the week ended October 16, 2026

Philadelphia Semiconductor Index: Down approximately 11.4 per cent

Micron Technology: Down approximately 14.6 per cent

Samsung Electronics: Down approximately 18 per cent

SK Hynix: Down approximately 24 per cent

US September inflation: 3.7 per cent annually

Estimated 2026 AI-related investment-grade issuance: Approximately US$300 billion