Eurozone’s Economy Outpaced China and U.S. in 2022
The currency-area grew at a faster clip than its global peers, reversing traditional positions
The currency-area grew at a faster clip than its global peers, reversing traditional positions
The eurozone economy grew faster than China and the U.S. last year, underlining how the fading Covid-19 pandemic continues to scramble traditional patterns of global growth.
Figures released by the European Union’s statistics agency Tuesday showed the currency- area’s economy grew at an annualised rate of 0.5% as higher energy costs weighed on household spending. This translated into 3.5% growth in gross domestic product for 2022 as a whole, a faster rate than seen in either China or the U.S.
This is unusual. For decades, the big three engines of the global economy have had a pretty stable ranking: China grew fastest, followed by the U.S. and then the eurozone. This all changed last year because of the staggered manner in which major economies reopened in the wake of the pandemic.
Figures released Thursday showed the U.S. economy grew by 2.1% in 2022, a sharp slowdown from the 5.9% rate of expansion recorded in 2021. Earlier this month, China’s statistics agency released figures that showed the world’s second-largest economy grew by 3%, down from 8% the previous year.
The last time that the combined national economies that make up the eurozone grew at a faster pace than that of either China or the U.S. was in 1974. The U.S. economy has typically outpaced Europe’s over recent decades largely because its population has grown more quickly. More recently, the U.S. has led Europe in the development of fast-growing technology sectors.

Last year’s unusual growth ranking largely reflects the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the world economy, with the timing of lockdowns and re openings leading to big swings in growth, as well as high rates of inflation.
It is an effect that is unlikely to last. As China abandons its zero-Covid policy, it is likely to reclaim its position as the fastest-growing of the big three economic areas. And the war in Ukraine is having a bigger impact on the economy of Europe than that of the U.S. or China, as the slowdown in the last quarter of 2022 testifies.
“2022 was just a weird, weird year,” said European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde during a panel at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos earlier this month. “Those are not normal numbers, this is not the usual ranking that you have.”
In the eurozone, the influence of the pandemic on the economy was so strong last year that it offset that of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the surge in energy prices it prompted.
While China experienced a series of lockdowns in pursuit of its zero-Covid policy, the eurozone enjoyed its first full year without tight restrictions, and a boost to activity that the U.S. had experienced a year earlier.
The big three economies locked down hard in 2020. But the U.S. reopened more fully from early 2021, outpacing the eurozone and China in the first three months of that year in particular. The eurozone’s reopening boost started later, and carried over into the first half of 2022 as its key tourism industry rebounded.
This year is likely to see the pandemic continue to have a big impact on growth—this time in China. The country lifted many of its zero-tolerance pandemic controls in early December in an abrupt change of course. While that led to an increase in Covid-19 infections and deaths, it also opened the door to a sharp economic rebound in the world’s second-largest economy.
For this year, the United Nations expects China’s economy to grow by 4.8%. It expects both the U.S. and the eurozone to slow, to 0.4% and 0.2% respectively. If it is correct, the normal growth ranking will be restored, although at lower-than-normal rates of growth. And from 2024, the pandemic’s impact is set to wane, unless a more deadly, rapidly-spreading coronavirus variant emerges.
“By 2024 we should be out of the woods,” said Hamid Rashid, head of the U.N.’s global economic monitoring unit. “We are still having the lingering impact of the pandemic in 2022 and 2023.”
High inflation rates, partly a legacy of the pandemic, are also expected to fade by 2024. Inflation rates began to surge in early 2021 as the reopening of the U.S. and other economies led to a surge in demand for goods and services at a time when global supply chains were still impaired.
According to a measure of supply-chain pressures compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the blockages caused by the pandemic reached a peak at the end of 2021, and then eased steadily through the first nine months of last year. But that improvement in supply chains stalled in the final three months of 2022 as China imposed lockdowns to counter fresh outbreaks of Covid-19. Supply chains seem set to continue their slow return to prepandemic conditions in 2023 after the zero-tolerance strategy was abandoned.
Rates of inflation around the world appear to be easing, but it has taken unusually aggressive action by global central banks to get to that point. The Federal Reserve has raised interest rates by more than 4 percentage points since March, the largest move in a single year since 1980. The European Central Bank has moved at a slower pace, pushing up its policy rate by 2.5 percentage points starting in July, but that is the fastest increase since it was founded in 1998.
Both central banks are expected to raise their key interest rates this week, with the ECB likely to tighten more than the Fed. Further increases in borrowing costs will affect businesses and households not just in the U.S. and Europe, but around the world.
“The global effects are real, but they are not taken into account by the systemically important central banks,” said Mr. Rashid at the U.N., “it is harder for developing countries to borrow and invest.”
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As housing drives wealth and policy debate, the real risk is an economy hooked on growth without productivity to sustain it.
As housing drives wealth and policy debate, the real risk is an economy hooked on growth without productivity to sustain it.
For decades, Australia has leaned into its reputation as the lucky country. But luck, as it turns out, is not an economic strategy.
What once looked like resilience now appears increasingly fragile. Beneath the surface of rising property values and steady headline growth, the Australian economy is showing signs of strain that can no longer be ignored.
Recent data paints a sobering picture. Australia has recorded one of the largest declines in real household disposable income per capita among advanced economies.
Wages have failed to keep pace with inflation, meaning many Australians are working harder for less. On a per capita basis, income growth has stalled and, at times, reversed.
And yet, on paper, things still look relatively solid. GDP is growing. Unemployment remains low. But that growth is increasingly being driven by population expansion rather than productivity.
More people are contributing to output, but not necessarily improving living standards.
That distinction matters.
For years, Australia’s economic success rested on a powerful combination: a once-in-a-generation mining boom, a credit-fuelled housing market, strong migration and a property sector that rarely faltered. Between 1991 and 2020, the country avoided recession entirely, building enormous wealth in the process.
But much of that wealth is tied to property. Around two-thirds of household wealth sits in real estate, inflated by leverage and sustained by demand. It has worked, until now.
The problem is the supply side of the economy has not kept up.
Housing supply is falling behind population growth. Rental vacancies are near record lows.
Construction firms are collapsing at an elevated rate. At the same time, massive infrastructure pipelines are competing with residential projects for labour and materials, pushing costs higher and delaying delivery.
The result is a system under pressure from all angles.
Despite near full employment, productivity growth has stagnated for years. In simple terms, Australians are putting in more hours without generating more output per hour. The economy is running faster, butgoing nowhere.
Meanwhile, government spending continues to expand. Public debt is approaching $1 trillion, with spending now accounting for a record share of GDP.
The gap between spending and revenue has been filled by borrowing for decades, adding further pressure to an already stretched system.
This is where the uncomfortable question emerges.
Has Australia become too reliant on a model driven by rising property values, expanding credit and population growth?
As asset prices rise, households feel wealthier and borrow more. Banks lend more. Governments collect more revenue. Migration fuels demand. The cycle reinforces itself.
But when productivity stalls and debt outpaces real income, the system begins to depend on constant expansion just to stay stable.
It is not a collapse scenario. But it is not particularly stable either.
Nowhere is this more evident than in housing.
The National Housing Accord targets 1.2 million new homes over five years, yet current completion rates are well below that pace. With approvals falling and construction costs rising, the gap between supply and demand is widening, not narrowing.
Housing is also one of the largest contributors to inflation, with costs rising sharply across rents, construction and utilities. Yet the private sector, from small investors to major developers, is struggling to make projects stack up in the current environment.
This brings the policy debate into sharper focus.
Tax settings such as negative gearing and capital gains concessions have undoubtedly boosted demand over the past two decades. But they have also supported supply. Removing them may ease prices briefly, but risks deepening the supply shortage over time.
That is the paradox.
Policies designed to make housing more affordable can, in practice, make the shortage worse if they discourage development. The optics may appeal, but the economics are far less forgiving.
It is also worth remembering that most property investors are not institutional players. The majority own just one investment property. They are, in many cases, ordinary Australians using real estate as their primary wealth-building tool.
Undermining that system without replacing it with a viable alternative risks unintended consequences, from reduced supply to higher rents and increased inflation.
So where does that leave Australia?
At a crossroads.
The country can continue to rely on population growth and rising asset prices to drive economic activity. Or it can shift towards a model built on productivity, innovation and sustainable growth.
The latter is harder. It requires structural reform, long-term thinking and political discipline.
But it is also the only path that leads to genuine, lasting prosperity.
The question is no longer whether Australia has been lucky.
It is whether it can evolve before that luck runs out.
Paul Miron is the Co-Founder & Fund Manager of Msquared Capital.
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