The AI Boom Is Coming for Apple’s Profit Margins

Apple has dominated the electronics supply chain for years. No more.

Artificial-intelligence companies are writing huge checks for chips, memory, specialised glass fibre and more, and they have begun to out-duel Apple in the race to secure components.

Suppliers accustomed to catering to Apple’s every whim are gaining the leverage to demand that the iPhone maker pay more.

Apple’s normally generous profit margins will face pressure this year, analysts say, and consumers could eventually feel the hit.

Chief Executive Tim Cook mentioned the problem in a Thursday earnings call, saying Apple was seeing constraints in its chip supplies and that memory prices were increasing significantly.

Those comments appeared to weigh on Apple shares, which traded flat despite blowout iPhone sales and record company profit.

“Apple is getting squeezed for sure,” said Sravan Kundojjala, who analyses the industry for research firm SemiAnalysis.

AI chip leader Nvidia recently became the largest customer of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing , or TSMC, Nvidia Chief Executive Jensen Huang said on a podcast.

Apple had been TSMC’s biggest customer by a wide margin for years. TSMC is the world’s leading manufacturer of advanced chips for AI servers, smartphones and other computing devices.

Spokesmen for Apple and TSMC declined to comment.

The big computers that handle AI tasks don’t look like the smartphones consumers own, but many companies supply components for both. In particular, memory chips are in short supply as companies such as OpenAI, Alphabet’s Google, Meta , Microsoft and others collectively spend hundreds of billions of dollars to build AI computing capacity.

“The rate of increase in the price of memory is unprecedented,” said Mike Howard , an analyst for research firm TechInsights.

That applies both to the flash memory chips that store photos and videos, called NAND, as well as the memory used to run apps quickly, called DRAM.

By the end of this year, the price of DRAM will quadruple from 2023 levels, and NAND will more than triple, estimates TechInsights.

Howard estimates that Apple could pay $57 more for the two types of memory that go into the base-model iPhone 18 due this fall compared with the base model iPhone 17 currently on sale. For a device that retails for $799, that would be a big hit to profit margins.

Apple’s purchasing power and expertise in designing advanced electronics long made it an unrivaled Goliath among the Asian companies that make most of the iPhone’s parts and assemble the device.

Apple spends billions of dollars a year on NAND, for instance, according to people familiar with the figures, likely making it the single biggest buyer globally. Suppliers flocked to win Apple’s business, hoping to leverage its know-how and prestige to attract other customers.

These days, however, “the companies now pushing the boundaries of human‑scale engineering are the ones like Nvidia,” said Ming-chi Kuo, an analyst with TF International Securities.

Demand for AI hardware is poised to keep growing rapidly. Apple’s spending growth is modest in comparison with what is being spent to fill up AI data centers, even though it is breaking records with huge sales of the iPhone 17.

Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix are raising the price of a type of DRAM chip for Apple, according to people familiar with Apple’s supply chain.

Big AI companies pay generously and are willing to lock in supply and make upfront payments, giving the South Korean chip makers leverage against the iPhone maker.

Apple signs long-term contracts for memory, but it has used its heft to squeeze suppliers.

Its contracts have empowered it to negotiate prices as often as weekly, and to even refuse to buy any memory from a supplier if Apple didn’t view the price as favorable, according to people familiar with its memory purchases.

To boost leverage with suppliers, Apple even began stocking more inventory of memory. That was atypical for Cook, who normally cuts inventory to the bone to maximize Apple’s cash flow.

Apple is fighting not only for current deliveries but also for the attention of engineers at suppliers.

Glass scientists who worked on developing the smoothest and lightest smartphone displays are now also spending time on specialised glass for packaging advanced AI processing chips, according to industry executives.

Makers of sensors and other gizmos inside the iPhone are winning new business from AI companies such as OpenAI that are developing their own hardware.

Still, suppliers said they were far from giving up on business with Apple. Working with Apple is a form of education, they said, because it remains one of the most demanding and disciplined customers in the industry.

TSMC, the Taiwanese chip manufacturer, has built successive generations of its most advanced chips with Apple as its lead customer, relying on the big predictable demand for iPhones.

Now that TSMC is doing more business with Nvidia and other AI companies, people with knowledge of the chip supply chain said Apple was exploring whether some lower-end processors could be made by someone other than TSMC.

One of Apple’s biggest profit-spinners is selling extra memory for far more than the memory chips cost the company.

Last fall Apple discontinued the iPhone Pro model with 128 gigabytes of storage.

Customers who want that model must now start at 256 gigabytes and pay $100 more—the type of move that could be repeated this year to help Apple offset higher costs, wrote Craig Moffett, an analyst at Moffett Nathanson, in an investor note.

However, Apple isn’t expected to raise the price of its next iPhone models over similarly equipped iPhone 17s, said Kuo, the analyst.

News Corp, owner of The Wall Street Journal, has a commercial agreement to supply news through Apple services.

Central banks may be accidentally subsidizing government borrowing through their efforts to prevent a repeat of past market blowups, and policymakers are starting to worry that anticrisis lending facilities could even be interfering with their own monetary policy.

The source of the problem is the switch from central banks being the lender of last resort to, in 2008 and 2020, also being market makers of last resort, ensuring corporate—and government—debt markets keep functioning. During a crisis, support is often essential to prevent a downward spiral that destroys the financial system.

But backstopping markets removes a key risk and encourages more borrowing—especially for the hedge funds that now own trillions of dollars of U.S. Treasurys.

“Ironically, vulnerability is created by mechanisms that were introduced to reduce vulnerability,” said Huw Pill, the Bank of England’s chief economist, one of those growing concerned, in an interview. “So, it’s a bit like a whack-a-mole kind of story.”

Offering either an explicit or implied guarantee that government-funding markets will remain open and liquid means hedge funds have less risk of being unable to finance highly leveraged trades. This is particularly true for the overnight repurchase, or repo, market, where borrowers pledge bonds for cash. The result has been a huge expansion of two popular government bond trades, arbitraging Treasurys or British gilts against bond futures or swaps.

The scale is extraordinary: The Dallas Fed estimates hedge funds ended last year with $2.4 trillion of Treasurys, up from $600 billion a decade earlier. Because the profits on each trade are tiny, hedge funds have to leverage as much as 100 times to get worthwhile returns, creating new risks.

This might sound abstruse. But in 2020, it was the Treasury basis trade blowing up that forced the Fed to intervene. In 2025, signs of trouble in the swap trade pushed President Trump to retreat from his tariff plan.

Pill worries that the reassurance central-bank policy provides bleeds into monetary policy by boosting borrowing. This, in turn, keeps government-debt yields lower than they otherwise would be.

“There’s lots of gilts to be bought,” he says. “How do you support that buying of gilts? You make it attractive. How do you make it attractive? Well, there are some imperfections in the market. So those imperfections create profit opportunities, but they’re not very big. So how do you make them more meaningful? You allow leverage to build up.”

“That’s good for the government because it gets to sell the gilts at a lower [yield] than it otherwise would. It’s good for the financial sector because they’re able to extract these rents effectively. And it’s good for the central bank because the market seems to be liquid and functioning. But all of those things are true until they’re not true.”

When it goes wrong, the more leverage, the worse the problem. And the worse the problem, the more likely it becomes that central banks have to create yet more special tools to address it. That then spurs the next buildup of leverage.

Pill thinks more effort is needed to come up with a modern version of the Bagehot Doctrine. Walter Bagehot, the 19th-century editor of the Economist magazine, summed up the role of the central bank as being to lend to banks freely, against good collateral, at a penalty rate. Access to instant cash helps banks withstand runs. The fact the central bank is offering a backstop should make the run less likely, and shareholders are penalized, through the penalty rate, if it is used.

English economist and journalist Walter Bagehot. Hulton Archive/Getty Images

Tools for saving markets from drying up are more haphazard. In 2020 the Fed, BOE and others just bought lots of government debt to inject liquidity into markets. That worked because, even though quantitative easing is also a monetary policy tool, they also wanted easier money.

Unfortunately, that created what Pill described as a tinderbox, ignited by the energy crisis after Russia invaded Ukraine. The excess money creation from left over from emergency QE then fanned the flames of inflation. This made it much harder to calibrate monetary policy when central banks decided to tighten (although policymakers were also, in my view, far too slow to recognize inflation).

Pill points to the “temporary, targeted” BOE buying of gilts amid the forced selling by leveraged pension funds after Britain’s botched tax-cut plan in September 2022 as a successful model. At a time when the BOE was trying to tighten monetary policy, it intervened in a way that stopped the pension fund selling spiral and stabilized gilts. Yet the central bank maintained tight monetary policy.

Bagehot would recognize the goal: Reduce the encouragement to take risk, known as moral hazard, that offering guarantees in advance creates, but retain the ability to mount a rescue in a crisis.

Unfortunately, much of central banking is going backward on this. Moral hazard is increasing, even for banks. In the 2023 bank bailout, the Fed accepted less-than-full collateral, recognizing Treasury bonds at face value rather than their (much lower) market value.

The emergency rescue facility then became a funding facility that even healthy banks chose to tap—in effect easing monetary policy by the back door and prompting the Fed to tighten the terms before it ended. Something similar could be under way with Japan’s plans to use an emergency Fed loan facility to raise cash to prop up the yen without having to sell its hoard of Treasurys.

I don’t know how to break the cycle of crises needing rescues that lead to more leverage and new crises. And I’m concerned we’re firmly into the added-leverage phase of the latest cycle.

At least central bankers are still thinking about it, even if they don’t, so far, have good answers.

The AI Boom Is Coming for Apple’s Profit Margins

Parts for iPhones to cost more owing to surging demand from AI companies.