Shoe Brands’ Secret to Success? Going Slow
Trendy shoe brands such as Hoka, On and Birkenstock are taking a page out of luxury’s playbook
Trendy shoe brands such as Hoka, On and Birkenstock are taking a page out of luxury’s playbook
Hoka sneakers, On shoes, Ugg boots and Birkenstock sandals don’t look very much alike, but they do have one thing in common: They have all been flying off the shelf. What are they doing right?
Getting a shoe’s comfort, performance and style right is important. But these brands also have taken a page out of luxury brands’ playbook by being choosy about where they make their shoes available and pacing growth.
Deckers Outdoor , which owns both Hoka and Ugg, has seen healthy growth at both brands. Sales at Ugg, its largest brand, rose 16% last fiscal year and are expected to grow by a further 7.4% in the current fiscal year. Revenue at Hoka, its second-largest brand, has managed an impressive compound annual growth rate of roughly 50% over the last four years, while its competitor, On, averaged compound growth of more than 65% over the comparable period. Revenues for both On and Hoka are expected to expand by some 25% this year. Sandal brand Birkenstock is set to increase revenue by a double-digit percentage in each of the next few years.

Industry analysts say Deckers stands out for the meticulous way it allocates inventory. The company learned its lesson through Ugg boots, which were popular in the early 2000s before fizzling out. The company made a decision in 2016 to stop distributing through certain retailers, pulling back from some 200 stores. Instead, it narrowed its distribution through larger partners such as Amazon and Macy’s. That effort, alongside buzzy, limited supply launches of some styles—such as the Ultra Mini Platforms—helped boost brand cachet.
Deckers applied those learnings to Hoka, which it acquired in 2012. The company has been introducing Hoka to retail partners at a “slow, deliberate pace,” and has been picky about the stores it works with, according to Joseph Civello, equity analyst at Truist Securities. The brand is also intentional about the styles it introduces by store: For example, putting performance-driven sneakers at running specialty stores while prioritising style-forward shoes at locations like Foot Locker to attract sneakerheads, according to Civello.
Hoka rival On has opted for a selective strategy, too, though it made some mistakes along the way. The company has stopped selling at discount shoe seller DSW in the U.S. and at stores it classifies as “comfort” shoe retailers in Europe, where the brand wasn’t reaching the right audience. Its current retail partners include specialty running stores such as Fleet Feet and upscale department store Nordstrom .
Birkenstock is another example: The brand typically ships retailers about 75% of what they would like to order, according to a research note from Evercore. In a September industry conference, Birkenstock Americas President David Kahan said the scarcity model drives consumers’ “urgency to buy.” “Nobody is buying the product and price comparing—[asking], can I get it cheaper someplace else?” he said.
The selective strategy is clearly showing up on these companies’ bottom lines: Deckers Outdoor, On and Birkenstock all boast gross margins exceeding 55%. On’s 60% gross margins are closer to luxury behemoth LVMH’s than to Nike ’s.
Getting the quantity of inventory right is important, but so is achieving the right mix of where it is sold. These brands would make more profit if they started channeling more sales through their own stores and websites. But as Nike learned the hard way, companies can also shoot themselves in the foot by trying to abandon middlemen too quickly . Sneaker upstarts like Hoka probably benefited from Nike’s decision to abruptly exit retail stores, notes Paul Lejuez, equity analyst at Citi. Deckers Outdoor, On and Birkenstock are increasing the share of shoes sold directly, but they are doing so slowly. Retail partners still account for about 60% of sales at all three companies.
Retail is littered with examples where brands’ desire for rapid growth backfired. Under Armour , for example, was the subject of an accounting probe a few years back, after it was accused of trying to inflate quarterly sales numbers by urging retailers to take products early and redirecting goods to off-price chains like T.J. Maxx in the final days of a quarter. The company settled those claims without admitting or denying wrongdoing. Whether or not those claims were true, Under Armour’s overexposure to discount sellers cheapened the brand’s image, which it is still trying to recover .
VF Corp., which acquired popular streetwear brand Supreme in 2020, failed to keep the brand’s street cred going, possibly because it made products too available . It sold Supreme to EssilorLuxottica earlier this year.
Publicly listed companies are prone to short-term thinking because they are beholden to investors who want to see growth quarter to quarter. That isn’t the case for European luxury conglomerates, which are publicly traded but are still family controlled and, thus, can put the brakes on short-term revenue growth in favour of long-term cachet.
To keep the streak of success going, investors of these popular shoemakers might need to adopt the patience of luxury-conglomerate families.
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Overall, the season showed that share prices react less to whether profits rose or fell than to the gap between results and expectations
Reporting season has once again reminded investors that a strong profit does not guarantee a rising share price, and a large loss does not always trigger a sell-off. What matters most is how each result compares with expectations and, increasingly, what management says about the year ahead. During the August 2026 season, companies offering credible turnarounds or unexpectedly strong guidance were rewarded handsomely, while those flagging weaker margins, slowing demand or greater uncertainty were punished.
The following ranking draws on Morningstar’s review of 164 ASX-listed companies and measures each company’s share-price movement on the day it reported. This captures the market’s immediate response to the earnings announcement, before subsequent economic developments, dividends and company-specific news cloud the picture. Here are the five biggest winners, and the five hardest-hit losers, of the season so far.
Bapcor delivered reporting season’s largest relief rally after presenting early evidence that its troubled automotive-parts business was stabilising. Although underlying revenue fell 1.8% to $1.92 billion and underlying NPAT collapsed 85% to $10.8 million, underlying EBITDA of $152.5 million exceeded guidance.
More importantly, working-capital initiatives released $68.5 million in the second half, lifting cash conversion to 109.4% and reducing net debt by 63% to $135 million. The statutory loss was $431.6 million, largely because of non-cash impairments. Investors focused on improving operational momentum, stronger liquidity and management’s expectation of modest FY27 revenue growth.
Zip comfortably surpassed its FY26 targets, sending the buy-now-pay-later provider’s shares sharply higher. Transaction volume rose 23% to $16.7 billion, while cash earnings before tax, depreciation and amortisation jumped 58% to a record $268.9 million. Statutory profit climbed 46% to $116.4 million, and the cash operating margin expanded by 4.2 percentage points to 20%.
The strongest signal was guidance for FY27 cash earnings of $340 million—around 26% growth and above analysts’ forecasts. US transaction volume increased 42.5% and now represents three-quarters of group volume, offsetting weaker customer activity in Australia.
CSL’s result was hardly spectacular in isolation, but it cleared a market bar that had fallen dramatically following earlier downgrades and restructuring announcements. Underlying NPATA was US$3.1 billion, down 2% in constant-currency terms, while operating cash flow reached US$3.51 billion.
CSL maintained its full-year dividend at US$2.92 per share and completed a A$1 billion buyback. The real catalyst was FY27 guidance for approximately 5% underlying profit growth, compared with market expectations closer to 2%. After an extended period of earnings disappointments, investors interpreted the outlook as evidence that CSL’s core plasma business was approaching a sustainable recovery.
Judo Capital demonstrated strong operating leverage as its specialist business-lending franchise expanded. Full-year profit before tax rose 34% to $168.1 million, while pre-provision profit increased 42%. Gross loans and advances grew 18% to $14.7 billion, reaching the top of the bank’s guidance range and comfortably exceeding broader system growth.
Deposits increased 24% to $12.2 billion, return on equity improved by 1.1 percentage points to 6.4%, and earnings per share rose 29% to 9.9 cents. Reaffirmation of the FY27 outlook gave investors confidence that loan growth could continue without sacrificing margins or credit quality.
The owner of Supercheap Auto, rebel, BCF and Macpac reported record sales of $4.2 billion, up 3.2%, despite cautious discretionary spending. Profitability went backwards: normalised profit before tax fell 7% to $306 million and normalised NPAT declined 2.8% to $226 million as transformation spending weighed on margins. Nevertheless, the result exceeded subdued expectations, online sales grew 5.3% and membership across the group’s loyalty programs reached 13.1 million. Investors were also encouraged by positive early FY27 trading, stable gross margins and continued market-share gains. A fully franked 33-cent final dividend added to the appeal.
Hansen’s historic result met expectations, but investors recoiled from its outlook. The utility and communications software provider achieved an underlying EBITDA margin of 31%, exceeding its 30% target, while generating strong cash flow. However, management designated FY27 an “investment and transition year”, signalling a roughly five-percentage-point margin contraction as spending on products, sales capabilities and organisational changes increased.
Revenue had already been broadly flat, leaving investors concerned that the investment program would depress earnings before new growth appeared. Leadership changes, including the chief executive’s departure, added uncertainty. Management expects revenue growth and margins above 30% to return in FY28, but the market was unwilling to wait.
Life360’s headline growth was impressive: quarterly revenue rose 38% to US$159 million, subscription revenue increased 31%, and adjusted EBITDA climbed 53% to US$31.1 million. Monthly active users reached 102.4 million and paying circles grew 27% to 3.2 million. The sell-off reflected expectations rather than a collapsing business.
Net income fell 18%, the net margin contracted from 6% to 3%, hardware shipments dropped 18%, and full-year EBITDA guidance was merely maintained. After a strong valuation run, investors wanted a larger upgrade and clearer evidence that heavy investment in advertising, international expansion and artificial intelligence would generate additional earnings.
PEXA reported a 7% increase in continuing-operations revenue and 12% EBITDA growth to $152 million, accompanied by a two-percentage-point margin expansion. Free cash flow increased 39%, suggesting the core Australian electronic-conveyancing platform remained highly profitable. Investors instead concentrated on management’s warning that property-transfer volumes could decline, alongside regulatory uncertainty surrounding the fees PEXA can charge.
The company is also continuing to invest heavily in its loss-making international expansion. Morningstar considered the market reaction excessive, arguing that structural transfer-volume assumptions had not materially changed, but the combination of softer near-term activity and regulatory risk overwhelmed the respectable headline numbers.
SEEK produced solid FY26 figures, including 10% revenue growth to $1.20 billion, a 15% rise in EBITDA and 28% growth in adjusted earnings per share. It also lifted its fully franked annual dividend by 13% to a record 52 cents. Those achievements were overshadowed by falling paid job-ad volumes and cautious FY27 assumptions.
The statutory accounts included a $201 million loss from the SEEK Growth Fund and $377 million of significant items, making the headline result considerably less attractive. Investors were particularly concerned that economic weakness could limit volumes while the company continued investing in platform integration and artificial-intelligence products.
JB Hi-Fi’s full-year result was broadly respectable, with group sales rising 5% to $11.1 billion and underlying earnings per share increasing 6% to $4.48. The damage came from its current-trading update. Australian sales were almost flat during the June quarter and deteriorated further in July, while earnings in the core Australian electronics business fell 3.6%.
Housing-related categories were particularly weak as higher living costs and interest rates constrained household budgets. With JB Hi-Fi entering the season on a demanding valuation, an in-line historic result was not sufficient: the loss of sales momentum prompted investors to rapidly reduce their expectations for FY27.
Overall, the season showed that share prices react less to whether profits rose or fell than to the gap between results and expectations. Bapcor was rewarded for being less troubled than feared, while several fundamentally profitable companies were punished because their outlooks failed to justify elevated valuations.
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