The Australian locations where homeowners are selling at a loss

Loss-making resales of homes and investment properties held for less than three years are on the rise, indicating more stress in the marketplace amid high interest rates and the cost-of-living crisis. CoreLogic data shows that of the 86,000 resales during the third quarter of 2023, 6.6 percent were sold at a loss after less than three years of ownership. This is up from 3.6 percent in the September quarter of 2022 and represents a 10-year high, according to CoreLogic’s head of research, Eliza Owen.

Properties held for three years or less represented one in five of all loss-making resales, according to the report. These types of sales were seen in many markets across the country. However, the areas recording the highest portion of these sales were Melbourne–Inner at 4.1 percent, Melbourne–West at 3.7 percent and Sydney’s Central Coast at 3.6 percent. The median loss for these resales was $30,000.

Most of the loss-making resales among properties held for less than three years were houses, at 64.8 percent. Ms Owen said this was quite a different trend to all loss-making resales across all tenure periods. On that broader basis, more of the overall loss-making resales were apartments at 70.9 percent.

It is a commonly held view among property experts that real estate must be held over the long term to achieve strong capital growth. This is partly because property prices typically move in cycles that can take several years to complete. Property is also an asset class that involves high entry and exit costs such as stamp duty, legal fees, marketing costs and agents’ commissions. This makes selling after only short periods of ownership undesirable, indicating that those who are choosing to do this are likely to be experiencing financial stress.

During the second half of 2023, thousands of mortgages rolled over from fixed periods of two or three years at interest rates below 2 percent or 3 percent to variable rates of above 5 percent or 6 percent. Some of these sales may reflect the ‘mortgage cliff’ effect of this change. Looking ahead, Ms Owen pointed out that the Reserve Bank of Australia is forecasting unemployment to rise to 4.2% by the end of 2024 and “this will test serviceability, and may lead to an increase in motivated selling for mortgagors with high debt levels and low savings buffers”.

Ms Owen also emphasises that short-term loss-making resales make up only a small portion of the Australian housing market and this was not expected to change. “This is ultimately a small share of mortgagors, so the portion of short–term resales is not expected to grow substantially from where it is now. Ongoing increases in home values nationally should contain the rate of loss-making short–term resales, though capital growth conditions were looking weaker across Sydney and Melbourne to the end of [2023],” she said.

For decades, Australia has leaned into its reputation as the lucky country. But luck, as it turns out, is not an economic strategy.

What once looked like resilience now appears increasingly fragile. Beneath the surface of rising property values and steady headline growth, the Australian economy is showing signs of strain that can no longer be ignored.

Recent data paints a sobering picture. Australia has recorded one of the largest declines in real household disposable income per capita among advanced economies.

Wages have failed to keep pace with inflation, meaning many Australians are working harder for less. On a per capita basis, income growth has stalled and, at times, reversed.

And yet, on paper, things still look relatively solid. GDP is growing. Unemployment remains low. But that growth is increasingly being driven by population expansion rather than productivity.

More people are contributing to output, but not necessarily improving living standards.

That distinction matters.

For years, Australia’s economic success rested on a powerful combination: a once-in-a-generation mining boom, a credit-fuelled housing market, strong migration and a property sector that rarely faltered. Between 1991 and 2020, the country avoided recession entirely, building enormous wealth in the process.

But much of that wealth is tied to property. Around two-thirds of household wealth sits in real estate, inflated by leverage and sustained by demand. It has worked, until now.

The problem is the supply side of the economy has not kept up.

Housing supply is falling behind population growth. Rental vacancies are near record lows.

Construction firms are collapsing at an elevated rate. At the same time, massive infrastructure pipelines are competing with residential projects for labour and materials, pushing costs higher and delaying delivery.

The result is a system under pressure from all angles.

Despite near full employment, productivity growth has stagnated for years. In simple terms, Australians are putting in more hours without generating more output per hour. The economy is running faster, butgoing nowhere.

Meanwhile, government spending continues to expand. Public debt is approaching $1 trillion, with spending now accounting for a record share of GDP.

The gap between spending and revenue has been filled by borrowing for decades, adding further pressure to an already stretched system.

This is where the uncomfortable question emerges.

Has Australia become too reliant on a model driven by rising property values, expanding credit and population growth?

As asset prices rise, households feel wealthier and borrow more. Banks lend more. Governments collect more revenue. Migration fuels demand. The cycle reinforces itself.

But when productivity stalls and debt outpaces real income, the system begins to depend on constant expansion just to stay stable.

It is not a collapse scenario. But it is not particularly stable either.

Nowhere is this more evident than in housing.

The National Housing Accord targets 1.2 million new homes over five years, yet current completion rates are well below that pace. With approvals falling and construction costs rising, the gap between supply and demand is widening, not narrowing.

Housing is also one of the largest contributors to inflation, with costs rising sharply across rents, construction and utilities. Yet the private sector, from small investors to major developers, is struggling to make projects stack up in the current environment.

This brings the policy debate into sharper focus.

Tax settings such as negative gearing and capital gains concessions have undoubtedly boosted demand over the past two decades. But they have also supported supply. Removing them may ease prices briefly, but risks deepening the supply shortage over time.

That is the paradox.

Policies designed to make housing more affordable can, in practice, make the shortage worse if they discourage development. The optics may appeal, but the economics are far less forgiving.

It is also worth remembering that most property investors are not institutional players. The majority own just one investment property. They are, in many cases, ordinary Australians using real estate as their primary wealth-building tool.

Undermining that system without replacing it with a viable alternative risks unintended consequences, from reduced supply to higher rents and increased inflation.

So where does that leave Australia?

At a crossroads.

The country can continue to rely on population growth and rising asset prices to drive economic activity. Or it can shift towards a model built on productivity, innovation and sustainable growth.

The latter is harder. It requires structural reform, long-term thinking and political discipline.

But it is also the only path that leads to genuine, lasting prosperity.

The question is no longer whether Australia has been lucky.

It is whether it can evolve before that luck runs out.

Paul Miron is the Co-Founder & Fund Manager of Msquared Capital.

The Australian locations where homeowners are selling at a loss

The portion of properties sold at a loss within three years of ownership has almost doubled in one year

As housing drives wealth and policy debate, the real risk is an economy hooked on growth without productivity to sustain it.